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Some Wrongs and (Human) Rights in the
English Same-Sex Marriage Debate
John Murphy*

I. INTRODUCTION
There is a rather peculiar aspect to the debate about whether samesex couples1 should be allowed to marry; one, indeed, that singles out the
issue from other related concerns that have been voiced at various times
by or on behalf of the homosexual community in England. It is this: the
claim for the extension of the right to marry to couples of the same sex
commands no consensus among those to whom it would be extended.
This is in marked contrast to the various equality claims—claims
regarding the age of consent to sexual activity,2 the freedom to serve in
the British military,3 and the treatment of employees4—that have all been
aired with a unified voice. For some—including a number of prominent
lesbian writers—the idea of same-sex marriage is just as repugnant as
heterosexual marriage. It can be opposed, they argue, on ideological
grounds according to which marriage is viewed as a distinctly patriarchal
This paper was presented at “The Future of Marriage and Claims for Same-Sex Unions Symposium”
on August 29, 2003 at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, on the campus of Brigham Young
University. The article is part of this special symposium issue and the views expressed herein are
those of the author and do not represent the views of the Journal of Public Law, the J. Reuben Clark
Law School, or Brigham Young University.
*
School of Law, University of Manchester, Manchester, England, UK. I am enormously grateful to
my colleague, Jo Winter, for her many helpful comments on an earlier draft (though she should not
be assumed to be in agreement with all of what is argued here). I must also record my gratitude to
the Copenhagen Business School: they provided me with very congenial surroundings in which to
write this paper as well as with invaluable research facilities.
1. Except where a necessary distinction is to be made, I shall throughout use what appears
to be the ecumenically acceptable term “same-sex couples” rather than speak speciously of “gays,”
“lesbians,” and “transsexuals.” Note that under English law, gender reassignment is not recognized
for the purposes of the law of marriage. See Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 99 (1970).
2. See, e.g., Sutherland v. United Kingdom, E.H.R.L.R. 117 (1997). But see Sexual
Offences (Amendment) Act 2000 (equalizing the age of consent between consenting males).
3. See, e.g., Smith v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493 (2000) (case involving
military personnel unlawfully dismissed because of their sexual orientation).
4. See, e.g., Grant v. South-West Trains, E.C.R. I-621 (1998). But for a compelling account
of how discrimination based on sexual orientation may be recast in terms of a form of direct sex
discrimination, see Robert Wintemute, Recognizing New Kinds of Direct Sex Discrimination:
Transsexualism, Sexual Orientation and Dress Codes, 60 MOD. L. REV. 334, 344-53 (1997).
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institution.5 For others, the matter begins and ends not with the question
of whether same-sex marriage would reinforce the patriarchal
underpinnings of society, but with the simple question of whether, in
normative terms, same-sex couples should possess a right to marry.
Yet even among those who would assert such a right, there remains a
notable absence of consensus as to the proper foundations of that right.
Some, such as the litigants in the Goodridge case,6 would assert such a
right in equality terms. According to this account, the right to marry is
viewed as fundamental to securing a range of protections, rights, and
responsibilities that many heterosexuals simply take for granted.7 By
contrast, a second group of proponents would identify the right to marry
as being a sub-species of the right to privacy. A third view is that a right
to marry a person of the same sex can be located within a broader set of
autonomy rights.8 This third view is a close relation of the argument that
same-sex marriage can be legitimated in terms of classical principles of
Kantian and Hegelian natural law theory.9
As we shall see in due course, these claims are either implausible or
simply untenable in practical terms in the English context. However, this
is not to say that a more specific equality claim grounded in English
human rights legislation cannot be made in support of same-sex
marriage. In fact, as I shall attempt to argue in due course, such a claim
may indeed be made, but this is to get ahead of ourselves. First, we must
appreciate that the divergence in opinion just indicated is in part
explicable by reference to one important point that is occasionally
overlooked. This is that many arguments both for and against same-sex
marriage involve a curious admixture of the legal, the political and the

5. See, e.g., Paula L. Ettlebrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in SAMEMARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds.,
1997); D. Herman, Are we Family?: Lesbian Rights and Women’s Liberation, 28 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 789 (1990); CAROL SMART, THE TIES THAT BIND: LAW, MARRIAGE AND THE REPRODUCTION
OF PATRIARCHAL RELATIONS (1984).
6. Goodridge v. Dep’t Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
7. Mary L. Bonauto, The Freedom to Marry for Same-Sex Couples in the United States of
America, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS 177, 177 (Robert Wintemute &
Mads Andenæs eds., 2001).
8. See, e.g., Nicholas Bamforth, Same-Sex Partnerships and Arguments of Justice, in LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 7, at 31, 41-46.
9. While Immanuel Kant speaks of the centrality in any free person of “human choice” and
“freedom of choice,” IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 13 (Mary Gregor ed. &
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996), Hegel sees “free consent” as being of the essence, GEORG
WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 201 (H.B Nisbet trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991). For a detailed— probably misguided—discussion of these theories
(because both Kant and Hegel saw marriage as a distinctly heterosexual union), see Alice Woolley,
Excluded By Definition: Same-sex Couples and the Right to Marry, 45 U. TORONTO L.J. 471, 499522 (1995).
SEX
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(abstract) moral-philosophical.10 It is small wonder, then, that there are
so many different views, and that some appear to be only slightly
nuanced versions of others. Yet general suggestions about what we
should do with the institution of marriage—especially vis-à-vis same-sex
couples—and what should be its legal incidents in the twenty first
century (assuming we support its preservation),11 can, it is suggested, be
disentangled from the necessarily prior question of whether same-sex
couples have or ought to have some kind of formal legal right to marry in
the first place. To answer this preliminary and more fundamental
question, we need only focus only on the current state of English law12
and assess whether as a matter of statutory construction the legislation
that currently prohibits same-sex marriage is properly consistent with
England’s subsequent legislative human rights commitments. In so
doing, we shall perforce encounter arguments relating to equality and
privacy, for these are central to the human rights framework. Yet it will
be explained that these rights—whatever their boundaries may be—must
be seen as quite different creatures in the English context than they are
understood to be in the United States (at least so far as grounding a right
to same-sex marriage is concerned).
First, however, it is best to explain why a number of rather popular
lines of argument are unhelpful in the English context, even beyond the
point (already made) that they often comprise a confusing cocktail of
political, philosophical and legal assertions.
II. UNHELPFUL APPROACHES
Before addressing the main strand of this article—that there may be a
human right to marry the person of one’s choosing regardless of
gender—there are a few preliminary matters that require a little
consideration. The first of these is that a definitional approach to the
question of whether same-sex marriage should be permitted is not just
unfounded (because it lacks substance), but also unhelpful because it
10. For a fuller account of these “internally heterogeneous” stances, see Janet Halley,
Recognition, Rights, Regulation, Normalisation: Rhetorics of Justification in the Same-Sex Marriage
Debate, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 7, at 97.
11. Nancy Polikoff, among others, would not see the problem in terms of marriage per se, but
in terms of its capacity to assume a dispositive role according to which certain rights and benefits are
distributed according to marital status alone. See Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For:
Why Legalising Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure Gender in
Every Marriage”, 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993).
12. The same analysis could be performed in relation to other parts of Britain. For while the
law in Britain is not uniform—there are three main jurisdictions: (i) England and Wales, (ii)
Scotland and (iii) Northern Ireland—the position in relation to same-sex marriage is the same in
each jurisdiction. Thus, references in this paper to English law might equally well be regarded as
referring to the law in Scotland and the law in Northern Ireland.
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obscures the fact that, though we may think we have a broadly accepted
notion of what marriage is and entails, we have but a specious
understanding of a much more general phenomenon. The fact that certain
types of atypical marriage—ones, indeed, that we would not even begin
to countenance domestically—are perfectly well recognized according to
our rules of private international law will be used to illustrate this point.
We will see that a proper conception of the genus union, marriage, is
rather less cluttered in essentialist terms than we have been culturally
taught to suppose and that same-sex marriages do not sit ill with this
minimalist conception of marriage.
The second preliminary point is that in our search for a more
fundamental premise for same-sex marriage we must reject those
accounts predicated on traditional notions of Natural Law. Those who
would seek to ground such unions in principles of Hegelian or Kantian
philosophy supply arguments that are at best indeterminate and at worst
simply implausible. More recent accounts of what is commonly termed
New Natural Law13 do not remedy these problems. For, as is well known,
the New Natural Lawyers—in particular Finnis—consider same-sex
sexual activity and relationships to be fundamentally at variance with the
basic goods and practical reasonableness they regard as central to their
theses.14 Even accounts centered on the autonomy ideal have little to
commend them in the context of real-life litigation or political lobbying.
A. Rejecting a Definitional Approach
Despite the fact that the traditional definition of marriage in English
law—”the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the
exclusion of all others”—was enunciated nearly 150 years ago in Hyde v.
Hyde,15 and despite the fact that this definition has become largely
outmoded as a reflection of the prevailing realities concerning marriage
in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries,16 it nonetheless
continues to be the usual starting point for any general doctrinal account
of the law of marriage in this country. But in assessing any claim for the
extension of the institution of marriage to same-sex couples, reliance on
the traditional legal definition is distinctly unhelpful. There are at least
two reasons for this. First, a definitional approach tells us nothing of the
intrinsic worth of marriage—what it is, in other words, about a marital
13. See, e.g., John M. Finnis, Law, Morality and “Sexual Orientation”, 69 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1049 (1994); ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW, chs. 8 & 9 (1999).
14. Finnis, supra note 13.
15. Hyde v. Hyde, L.R. 1 P. & D. 130, at 133 (1866), per Lord Penzance.
16. See Sebastian Poulter, The Definition of Marriage in English Law, 42 MOD. L. REV. 4
(1979).
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relationship that warrants specific legal acknowledgment. More bluntly,
a definitional approach fails to identify any normative justification for
regulating marriage in the way that we currently do (even though such
justification is something that we may legitimately expect of a regulatory
legal rule in a liberal society).17 As Alice Woolley has put it: “[b]y
relying on a stated definition, without exploring the concepts that justify
or underlie it, the court gives inadequate legal grounding for its
decision.”18
Concrete examples of the shortcomings of the definitional approach
can be gleaned from the realm of private international law insofar as this
approach applies to certain types of marriage that conflict with the
traditional definition of marriage in this country. The first type is
polygamous marriages. Naturally, such marriages are at variance with
the “one man and one woman” limb of the Hyde v. Hyde definition; yet
for most purposes the English courts are now prepared to recognize them.
This recognition stems not from the fact that the courts apply a different
definition of marriage in the conflicts arena: Hyde v. Hyde was, after all,
itself a private international law case. Rather, the courts’ preparedness to
recognize these unions derives from the application of “common sense,
good manners and a reasonable tolerance.”19 While these touchstones are
undeniably vague,20 it would nonetheless seem uncontroversial that it is
their application (rather than the rigid application of a strict definition of
marriage) that allows the courts to take account of the fact that in many
societies in which polygamy is practiced, there are often very good
reasons for permitting a plurality of wives. For instance, in some
societies that do not permit women to own property in their own right,
there has historically been a shortage of potential husbands (caused by
frequent wars and fatal hunting injuries).21 In other societies, polygamy
is justified according to a high cultural regard for it stemming not only
from the socioeconomic advantages that it can provide for husbands, but
also from the fact that it helps to define their community standing and

17. In the present context, the law may have regulatory (i.e., coercive) consequences for
others such as (i) employers required to pay some form of pension to the surviving spouse of a samesex marriage, or (ii) public or private landlords forced to recognize the survivor’s right to succeed to
a tenancy.
18. Woolley, supra note 9, at 478.
19. Cheni v. Cheni, P 85, at 99 (1965).
20. For criticism of the vagueness of this test, see John Murphy, Rationality and Cultural
Pluralism in the Non-Recognition of Foreign Marriages, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 643 (2000).
21. See also JOHN MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS IN FAMILY LAW (2004)
(forthcoming). For a more dated (but more thorough) account, see SEBASTIAN POULTER, ENGLISH
LAW AND ETHNIC MINORITY CUSTOMS ch. 4 (1986).
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prestige.22 The point is that a blinkered adherence to a hard-and-fast
definition of marriage would take no account of these factors which are the
very essence of broadmindedness and tolerance, and which supply the
normative basis for a definition of marriage alternative to our own.
Equal justification can be found for the recognition of arranged
marriages which, while frequently consensual, can certainly on one
interpretation be said to strain the language of the Hyde v. Hyde
requirement that the marriage be a “voluntary union.”23 Notably, within
Sikhism and Islam, arranged marriages are regarded as perfectly acceptable
because they are sanctioned and affirmed by patriarchal religious doctrines
prevailing in the relevant societies. And even beyond religious affirmation,
some South Asian cultures make family honor, or Izzat, depend in large
part on arranged marriages. This is because such marriages can be of
instrumental worth in a way that could not be guaranteed if the spouses
chose each other. As Ballard’s research reveals: “Izzat can be increased by
overshadowing other families . . . [and by] contracting prestigious marriage
alliances.”24 As such, simply to maintain this Izzat, “a family must send its
daughters in marriage to families of equal status” and “[t]o enhance its
Izzat, it must do better.”25 Again, these factors justify a concept of marriage
that, at least potentially, conflicts with our own definition.
These examples demonstrate two things. First, and most basically, the
genus union marriage is far more basic in nature than the English/JudeoChristian definition tends to suggest. Without suggesting this to be a
definitive description, marriage at its most basic seems to entail little more
than a publicly sanctioned union of two or more persons.26 If this is correct,
same-sex marriages are no more at variance with this genus union than
polygamous, arranged or even child marriages. The second thing revealed
by these illustrations is that if we are to understand and attempt to
legitimate any given form of marriage, we must be cognizant of the
appropriate normative justification that can be offered. This normative
justification will be inextricably tied to the prevailing social norms in any
given society. Thus, as social norms change from one society to another, we
must be prepared to accept different definitions and notions of marriage.
22. See, e.g., EUGENE HILLMAN, POLYGAMY RECONSIDERED: AFRICAN PLURAL MARRIAGE &
CHRISTIAN CHURCHES (1975). For Muslims, for example, polygamy is only acceptable subject to
the proviso that the man is able to provide adequately and equally for all his wives. See POULTER, supra
note 21, at 44-45.
23. Hyde v. Hyde, L.R. 1 P. & D. 130, at 130 (1866), per Lord Penzance.
24. C. Ballard, “Arranged Marriages in the British Context,” NEW COMMUNITY, Summer 1978,
at 181, 184.
25. Id.
26. We cannot even restrict this to adults since certain parts of the world, such as Nigeria,
permit child marriages. See Mohamed v. Knott, 1 Q.B. 1 (1969) (the case involved a 13-year-old girl
who married a mature gentleman).
THE
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But social norms also change over time within our own society. This is
important to bear in mind, for as John Eekelaar has observed, “there exists
within society a network of social norms which is formally independent of
the legal system, but which is in constant interaction with it.”27 This means
that we can properly expect that the legal rules and definitions that reflect
these norms will also change over time; and this is especially so in the arena
of family law.28 One would hope, then, that those who feel emotionally
tethered to the waning (if not exactly defunct) traditional definition of
marriage might at least acknowledge the scope for change on this basis.
The second reason why decisions about the freedom of any given
individual to marry another person of the same sex ought not to be taken
on the basis of the traditional definition of marriage is that the reasoning
involved would be self-referential and thus circular. As Beth Allen has
put it:
The argument that, by definition, marriage can involve only a man and
a woman because it has always included only opposite-sex couples, is
tautological and reminiscent of anti-miscegenation laws. The fact that
marriage has not included same-sex couples in the past does not explain
why that cannot be so now anymore than anti-miscegenation laws that
prevented interracial couples from marrying justified continuation of
those laws.29

In summary, a definitional approach is wholly unsuitable not just in
general terms, but especially when it is the very definition of marriage
that is under attack.
B. Rejecting a Privacy Approach
There are at least two reasons for suggesting that a privacy-based
approach would be of no avail in the English context.30 First, there is
something profoundly ironic about framing a claim for formal, public
recognition of a relationship in terms of privacy. Even if, as few would
dispute, the sexual side of any relationship is a most intimate and private
matter, there is still a world of difference between attacking the
criminalization of same-sex sexual relations on the grounds of privacy
and attacking the prohibition of same-sex marriage on that same basis.

27. John Eekelaar, Uncovering Social Obligations: Family Law and the Responsible Citizen,
in MAKING LAW FOR FAMILIES 16 (Mavis Maclean ed., 2000).
28. See John Dewar, The Normal Chaos of Family Law, 61 MOD. L. REV. 467 (1998).
29. Beth A. Allen, Same-Sex Marriage: A Conflict-of-Laws Analysis for Oregon, 32
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 619, 635-36 (1996).
30. For more general criticism of a privacy-based approach, see Bamforth, supra note 8, at
33-38.
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The marriage, as opposed to the sexual relationship it cements, bears an
inescapable public element.31
Secondly, such as it is, the English law concerning privacy rights
seems not to be concerned with homosexual relationships. The common
law in England has never embraced any tort based on the invasion of
privacy,32 and it naturally provides no coherent guidance as to what such
a right might entail.33 And although cases decided on the basis of the
laws of defamation, trespass and nuisance occasionally make passing
reference to privacy rights, they do not do so in the sense necessary to
substantiate a right to marry a person of the same sex. Indeed, the only
source of a specific right to privacy in this country is Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights34 which, along with most of the
Convention, was given statutory effect in England by virtue of the
Human Rights Act 1998.35 Article 8 provides bluntly that “[e]veryone
has the right to respect for his private and family life.” Ostensibly, this
provision might be thought to embody a positive right to respect for
one’s intimate same-sex relationship.36 Yet the jurisprudence to emanate
from both the European Court and Commission of Human Rights
suggests a major problem with this interpretation. This is because Article
8 has repeatedly received a disjunctive construction which treats the right
to respect for privacy and the right to respect for family life separately.
Furthermore, it seems well established that cases turning in whole or in
part on applicants’ same-sex relationships (as opposed to sexual activity

31. According to the law in England, whether a marriage takes place in a registry office or a
church (or other religious institution), statutory preliminaries (especially in relation to posting a
public notice), solemnization and registration turn on the significance of adequate publicity. See
Marriage Act 1949.
32. There have, however, been moves in this direction in recent years—see, especially,
Douglas v. Hello!, Q.B. 967 (2001), per Sedley LJ. For a fuller account, see JOHN MURPHY, STREET
ON TORTS ch. 1 (2003).
33. Bamforth, supra note 8, at 34, has suggested three possible interpretations: it might mean
(i) a right to a private space (ie, peaceful enjoyment of one’s home), or (ii) a private life (ie, the
lawful conduct of oneself in private is the concern of no other person or the state), or (iii) a right not
to have one’s personal details made public without one’s consent (though this latter is in part
covered by legislation dealing with medical records).
34. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, Europ. T.S. 005.
35. The very few provisions not incorporated into English law are of no significance in the
context of this paper. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
36. Under Article 8 a citizen has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, not
merely a right to privacy or family life. The inclusion of the word “respect” requires positive
conduct on the part of the state, not merely that it should refrain from doing things that would
undermine a person’s privacy or family life.
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or inclinations) have consistently been viewed as sounding in terms of
the right to respect for one’s family (not one’s private) life.37
C. Rejecting Abstract Approaches
In England, university teachers are entitled to join a trade union
known as the AUT (Association of University Teachers). During the
latter part of the 1980s the AUT campaigned about government underfunding of higher education. The official slogan of the campaign was
“rectify the anomaly.” No doubt it was a suitably academic quip, yet it
meant nothing to the general public or the media that might have been
relied on to publicize it. Cuts in government funding have continued
steadily ever since.
The implicit lesson here, of course, is that while high-level
theorizing and conceptual debate have a rightful place in academia, they
may not be the best tools to deploy when seeking to achieve a positive,
practical outcome. Arguments before the courts or political campaigns
aimed at legislators need to be couched in the kinds of terms to which
judges and politicians are most likely to be receptive.38 It seems
doubtful—or at least so it is submitted—that arguments grounded in
abstract theories of justice,39 natural law,40 and political morality41 are
likely to impress the lawmakers, even if they impress us as academics
and help to advance the frontiers of human thought.
Let us take, for example, arguments in favor of recognizing same-sex
relationships on the basis of the oft-vaunted principle of autonomy. In his
compelling essay, “Same-sex Partnerships and Arguments of Justice,”
Nicholas
Bamforth’s
fundamental
claim
is
that
“[a]utonomy/empowerment should . . . be advanced as the main
philosophical argument of justice in favour of according legal
recognition to same-sex partnerships.”42 He demonstrates ably that
privacy and equality claims in the United States often in truth collapse

37. See, e.g., Karner v. Austria, Application No. 40016/98; X, Y, & Z v. United Kingdom, 24
Eur. H.R. Rep. 143 (1997); Röösli v Germany, Application No. 28318/95.
38. William Eskridge, elsewhere in this special issue, has correctly identified that it is by
either of these routes that change tends to come about.
39. See, e.g., CARL F. STYCHIN, LAW’S DESIRE: SEXUALITY AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
(1995); ANTHONY GREY, QUEST FOR JUSTICE: TOWARDS HOMOSEXUAL EMANCIPATION (1992);
RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS SOCIETY AND LAW (1988); NICHOLAS
BAMFORTH, SEXUALITY, MORALS AND JUSTICE (1997).
40. See, e.g., Finnis, supra note 13 (opposing same-sex marriage on the grounds of New
natural law theory) and Woolley, supra note 9.
41. See, e.g., Robin West, Universalism, Liberal Theory & the Problem of Gay Marriage, 25
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 705 (1998); C. Pierce, Gay Marriage, J. SOCIAL PHIL. 5 (1995).
42. Bamforth, supra note 8, at 53.
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into arguments about autonomy, and thus identifies autonomy as the
central concern in this context. Yet he cannot but concede that:
[t]he constitutional provisions in force in any given society may
compromise the extent to which autonomy can be of use. If, for
example, there is no specific constitutional right to autonomy (or its
near sibling dignity) in the society concerned [as is the case in Britain],
it may be necessary to frame claims for legal recognition of same-sex
partnerships, whether this is to be achieved through litigation or
legislation, in terms of the constitutional rights that are recognised.43

With this concession in mind, it is certainly notable that English case
law and legislation in the fields of family and health care law almost
always shun the language of “autonomy” (or its synonym, “selfdetermination”) in connection with issues readily susceptible to its
application. A particularly good example of this occurring may be
observed in connection with children’s rights in relation to controversial
medical procedures. Here, both Parliament and the courts have eschewed
any recourse to the broad, abstract principle of autonomy. Unlike the
language of the academic commentators, the relevant legal rules and
decisions are couched in narrow, tightly defined terms with strict,
legalistic concepts such as “battery” and “effective consent” comprising
the relevant touchstones of adjudication in marked preference to the
ethical principle of “autonomy.”44
Similar criticisms can be made of Woolley’s attempt45 to justify
same-sex marriage according to the alternative bases of either the
Kantian categorical imperative that a person should marry to ensure that
he or she is not merely a means for another, but is an end for the other,46
or the Hegelian notion that love is “incomprehensible”47 without a
marriage that allows the individual properly to experience selfconsciousness.
Rawls captures well the limitations of such philosophical attempts to
advance legal causes when he states (albeit in connection with the
application of his theory of justice to the endeavour to understand the
underpinnings of freedom of expression) that:

43. Id.
44. Compare, e.g., Family Law Reform Act 1969, § 8, and Gillick v. West Norfolk, 3 All
E.R. 402 (1985), and Re R, 4 All E.R. 177 (1991), and Re W, 4 All E.R. 627 (1992) (all using the
language of effective consent), with, M. Brazier & C. Bridge, Coercion or Caring: Analysing
Adolescent Autonomy, 16 LEGAL STUDIES 84 (1996), and John Murphy, W(h)ither Adolescent
Autonomy?, J. SOC. WELFARE & FAMILY LAW 529 (1992); and C.M. Rogers and L.S. Wrightsman,
Attitudes Towards Children’s Rights–Nurturance or Self-determination, 34 J. SOC. ISSUES 59 (1978).
45. See Woolley, supra note 9, at 499-523.
46. See generally, KANT, supra note 9, at 61-64.
47. See HEGEL, supra note 9, at 41.
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[t]he conception of justice to which these principles belong is not to be
regarded as a method of answering the jurist’s questions, but as a
guiding framework, which . . . may orient their reflections, complement
their knowledge, and assist their judgment. We must not ask too much
of a philosophical view.48

Woolley fully accepts the veracity of this observation, yet seeks to
justify her own essentially philosophical account on the bases that
“traditional legal analysis is proving entirely inadequate in confronting a
modern problem” and that “there is no apparent method within the law
for abandoning that analysis and moving forward.”49 Her conclusion is
therefore that, faced with this problem, “the law may have to step outside
its own boundaries in order to acquire a framework through which the
problem can be analysed.”50 Yet, at least in the English context, there
may well be grounds to rebut Woolley’s assertion since the new legal
order ushered in by the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998 arguably
provides the necessary “method within law” of articulating a strong
legalistic claim for the acceptance of same-sex marriage. Furthermore,
unlike the more abstract accounts of a right for same-sex couples to
marry, an argument rooted in a human rights approach centers upon the
particular claimant and offers an individuated right rather than a general
or abstract right claimed on behalf of actual or prospective same-sex
couples.
III. A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH
Having dismissed as probably ineffectual (though not necessarily
unpersuasive) a number of familiar arguments, we turn now to the main
contention of this paper: that there is a basis on which two of England’s
human rights commitments read in conjunction with one another can be
construed as the foundations of a plausible rights-based claim to samesex marriage. It is an argument that, unlike many others, does not turn on
a conception of rights that hails from either the realms of legal or
political philosophy. Rather, the edifice of this argument is constructed
on the firm platform of two specific, constitutionally entrenched rights.
Like most arguments of a legalistic (as opposed to philosophical)
nature, the contention I shall advance may be met by equally legalistic
opposition. However, if my argument is found to be more compelling
than the various counter-arguments, there is at least one distinct
48. John Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND LAW:
SELECTED TANNER LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY 84 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1987)
(emphasis added).
49. Woolley, supra note 9, at 490.
50. Id.

10MURPHY.MACROED

554

5/26/2004 12:40 AM

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 18

advantage to this approach: there can be no judicial opposition to it on
the basis that the right claimed is not one recognized by the law. We
might usefully recall here the fact that a string of lawsuits in recent years
has failed for want of recognition by the English common law a
constitutional right to privacy51 and the fact that there is a marked
reluctance on the part of the English judiciary to adjudicate “children’s
autonomy” cases in those terms.52 It is also worth noting that, in one case
involving the claim of a homosexual man to succeed to the protected
tenancy of his now deceased same-sex partner, the Court of Appeal was
acutely aware of the constitutional constraints within which it could act.
As Waite LJ said:
Few would support the potential for unfairness involved in a law which
gives automatic succession rights to wives, however faithless, and
children, however feckless, and at the same time denies any hope of
succession to friends, however devoted their loyalty to the joint
household. [However] [t]he judge was nevertheless right, in my view,
to resist the temptation to change a bad law by giving it a new linguistic
twist. He correctly acknowledged that such changes could only be
made by Parliament.53

This acute awareness of the limitations of the judicial function—not
uncommon in English case law54—was echoed in the House of Lords
where there was an equal indication of a personal dislike for the content
of the law in question. Lord Slynn, for example, questioned “[w]hether
the result is socially desirable in 1999,” yet concluded that the decision
to remove gender-specific terminology was “a matter for Parliament”
rather than the courts”.55
So to which specific statutory provisions must we direct our
attention?
A. Article 12 and the Domestic Prohibition
The starting point for the present claim that a plausible construction
of English human rights legislation might pave the way for same-sex
marriage is actually the specific provision in the matrimonial legislation
that clearly prohibits such unions stating that a marriage shall be void if
the parties to it “are not respectively male and female.”56 It is a fairly
51.
52.
53.
54.
(2000).
55.
56.

See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Hous. Ass’n Ltd., Ch. 304 (1998).
S.M. Cretney & F.M.B. Reynolds, Limits of the Judicial Function, 116 L.Q. REV. 181
Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Hous. Ass’n Ltd., 1 A.C. 27, at 34 (2001).
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, § 11(c).
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plain and straightforward provision;57 and it clearly aims to preserve
marriage as an exclusively heterosexual institution. It is thus clear that
the task at hand is to find within the Human Rights Act 1998 an opposing
and superior position.
For the most part, the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms was incorporated into the Human Rights Act
1998 as Schedule 1 to that Act.58 As such, articles 12 and 14—the key
articles for the purposes of this paper—now operate with full statutory
force in England. Article 12 provides that “[m]en and women of
marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family,
according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.”
While this provision does not specify that men have the right to marry
only women (and vice versa), it may initially be interpreted in this way
since the Article affords the right to marry only subject to the national
laws of each state party to the Convention. Thus, since English statute
prohibits same-sex marriage, it ostensibly appears that the Convention
cannot be read as conferring a general right to marry the person of one’s
choice, but merely the person of the opposite sex of one’s choice. Indeed,
the European Court of Human Rights has twice held that the English
restriction of marriage to parties of the opposite sex is a legitimate
impediment to marriage, validly created by national law.59 Furthermore,
it has also said, on an earlier occasion, that the right to marry afforded by
Article 12 refers only to “the traditional marriage between persons of
opposite biological sex.”60 However, it would be wrong if the analysis
were to stop there.
B. Convention Mechanics, the European Court of Human Rights,and a
Reinterpretation of Article 12
Perhaps oddly to the common lawyer, the decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights are not binding. The court is fully at liberty to

57. There is an argument (thus far unsuccessful: see Rees v. United Kingdom, 9 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 56 (1986); Cossey v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 (1991); Sheffield v. United
Kingdom, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 163 (1999)) that since the subsection is framed in terms of a “male”
and a “female,” as opposed to a man and a woman, there is scope for it to be interpreted so as to
allow transsexuals to marry a person of their own pre-operative sex. For further discussion and a
suggestion as to why psychological sex might be a better criterion than biological sex, see Ian
McColl Kennedy, Transsexualism and Single Sex Marriage, 2 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 112 (1973).
58. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
59. Cossey v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 (1991); Sheffield v. United Kingdom,
27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 163 (1999).
60. Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. at para. 49. This was repeated in Cossey, at para. 49, and in
Sheffield, at para. 62.
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depart—sometimes quite radically61—from its own earlier decisions.
This is because the Convention is a “living instrument which . . . must be
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.”62 Thus, as those
conditions change, so might the interpretation of the Convention. As the
court explained in Marckx v. Belgium:
It is true that, at the time when the Convention was drafted, it was
regarded as permissible and normal in many European countries to
draw a distinction between the “illegitimate” and the “legitimate”
family. However, the Court recalls that this Convention must be
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.63

In addition to the acceptability of this protean interpretive technique,
it was held in Kjeldsen v. Denmark that the Convention is an “instrument
designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic
society.”64 Among these ideals and values, the court later explained, are
“pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness.”65 Taken together, the
principles of pluralism, tolerance and flexible interpretation mean that a
recognition of same-sex matrimony within Article 12 cannot be ruled
out, especially in view of the fact that two European countries—the
Netherlands and Belgium—have recently become the first in the world to
permit same-sex marriage. Nor is it immaterial that a large and growing
number of other European states have legislated to permit same-sex
registered partnerships,66 or that a later European instrument—the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union—proclaims the
right to marry in terms that make no reference to gender.67
Against such a background, it is suggested that the interpretation of
Article 12 is ripe for revisitation. Moreover, given the fact that there has
never actually been a direct application to either the Human Rights Court
or Commission involving a claim that Article 12 (either on its own, or
read in conjunction with Article 14) confers a right to contract a same-

61. Within four years of its controversial decision in Osman v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 245 (2000), the Human Rights Court performed a complete volte face in the twin decisions of Z
v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97 (2002), and TP and KM v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 42 (2002). See also Conor A. Gearty, Osman Unravels, 65 MOD. L. REV. 87 (2002), and Conor
A. Gearty, Unravelling Osman, 64 MOD. L. REV. 159 (2001).
62. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, para. 31 (1978).
63. 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 330, para. 41 (1979).
64. 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 711, at 731 (1976).
65. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 EHRR 737, 754 (1976).
66. For details, see K. Norrie, Would Scots Law Recognise a Dutch Same-sex Marriage?, 7
EDINBURGH L. REV. 147, 147-48 (2003).
67. Art. 9 provides simply that “the right to marry and the right to found a family shall be
guaranteed.” In Goodwin v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights assumed that
this omission of any reference to men and women was deliberate. 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18, para. 100
(2002).
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sex marriage,68 there is certainly no absence of opportunity to test this
claim. But what might this suggested reinterpretation of Article 12 look
like? To begin with, and recalling the hugely increased legal recognition
of same-sex relationships within European societies, it is at least
arguable that Article 12 is fit to be interpreted as conferring a general
right to marry, and that the reference to men and women alludes simply
to the fact that the right exists in favor of adults and not minors.
Certainly, the provision is sufficiently ambiguous to support such an
interpretation, for it will be noted that the Article does not state that the
right refers only to that of a man to marry a woman (or vice versa). Let
us suppose (not unreasonably) that same-sex marriage legislation will
proliferate around Europe in the next ten to twenty years. How then
might we expect the next generation of law students to interpret this
provision given that they will have been brought up in a Europe that
widely permits same-sex marriage? Is it not entirely plausible that they
will read it according to the norm that marriage should be confined to
adults rather than the norm that marriage is purely for heterosexuals? In
short, a major cause of the current tendency to give the ambiguous
Article 12 a heterosexist interpretation is the fact that it is being read
through culturally conditioned heterosexist eyes.
C. Objections to Reinterpretation of Article 12 and the Relevance of
Article 14
Even if we accept that Article 12 could be interpreted as conferring a
general right to marry, the obvious objection to reading into it the right to
marry a person of the same sex in England is the fact that Article 12 is
couched in terms that make the right it affords subordinate to domestic
legislation. As such, the objection would be that, even if Article 12 could
be construed as conferring a general right to marry, it must nonetheless
be read subject to impediments imposed by English domestic legislation.
And since there is a statute prohibiting same-sex marriage, the broad
interpretation of Article 12 is to no avail. It is at this point that Article 14
of the Convention becomes relevant. There it is provided that, “[t]he
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall
be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race,
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other
status.” If the statutory prohibition (dating from 1973) could be shown to
68. The various cases involving transsexuals have been predicated on a right to contract a
heterosexual marriage that involves recognition of a post-operative gender. See generally
Wintemute, Strasbourg to the Rescue? Same-Sex Partners and Parents Under the European
Convention, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 7, at 713-729.
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be discriminatory according to the terms of the 1998 Statute, there may
well be a strong case for the repeal of the 1973 prohibition. Certainly,
where other statutes have been shown to be at variance with the Human
Rights Convention, the legislature has been prepared to make the
necessary repeals. As Fredman explains (in relation to the watershed
Dudgeon case69 concerning the improper prohibition of homosexual
sexual conduct in Northern Ireland): “[t]he effect of Dudgeon . . . has
been of crucial importance. The removal of criminal prohibitions in
Northern Ireland triggered a chain if similar repeals within the UK.”70
Nonetheless, there are three possible difficulties associated with
trying to show that the current prohibition of same-sex marriage is
discriminatory in Article 14 terms. The first is that circumscribing the
right to marry the person of one’s choice by reference to the gender of
one’s would-be spouse is a matter which sounds in terms of sexual
orientation discrimination rather than sex discrimination: it only affects
gay men, lesbian women, or bisexuals of either gender and is thus not a
matter of sex discrimination. Since Article 14 makes no mention of the
wrongfulness of sexual orientation discrimination, the argument would
continue, it might therefore be taken to be legal to discriminate in these
terms (even if morally improper).71 The second possible problem stems
from the fact that differential treatment of certain people or groups is not
per se wrongful. If sufficient justification can be shown, the differential
treatment fails to qualify as (unlawful) discrimination. And since it can
be argued that a number of strong and cogent reasons do exist for
retaining marriage as an exclusively heterosexual institution, it may well
be that the exclusion of same-sex marriage is therefore an example of
differential (but not discriminatory) treatment. Thirdly, in the absence of
any direct domestic precedents, there is a potential problem lurking in the
fact that the guiding jurisprudence to have emanated thus far from
Europe has been anything but favorable to the contention that there
should be a right to same-sex marriage.
Not only must we attempt to meet each of these objections in turn,
but in case there be any residual doubt, we must also consider the further
line of argument according to which sexual orientation—quite apart from
being a discrete form of discrimination—has the capacity to ground an
argument premised on direct sex discrimination to which, importantly,
none of these objections apply.

69. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1982).
70. Sandra Fredman, Equality Issues, in THE IMPACT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL ON
ENGLISH LAW 111, 128-29 (Basil S. Markesinis ed., 1998).
71. Recall here the absence in England of any general constitutional equality guarantee.
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1. Sexual orientation discrimination not within article 14?
The fact that sexual orientation is not expressly mentioned within
Article 14 is the easiest of the three objections with which to deal. For,
despite the fact that there is no constitutional right in the United
Kingdom to be free from sexual orientation discrimination72—it is clear
that the list of forms of discrimination within Article 14 is not exclusive.
The Article specifically permits equality arguments to be grounded on
discrimination based on any “other status” of the applicant; and in the
context of the Article 8 right to respect for privacy, the court has already
acknowledged, on several occasions, that sexual orientation falls within
this category.73 Although the cases to date all refer to same-sex sexual
conduct and the Article 8 right to respect for privacy, Wintemute’s study
of the European Court’s recent decisions leads him to conclude that “the
Court’s case-law appears to be evolving towards a general principle that
all differences in treatment based on sexual orientation without a strong
justification violate the Convention.”74 It is also noteworthy that the
appellate domestic courts have shown themselves to be receptive to
sexual orientation discrimination arguments. For example, in the
Fitzpatrick case we considered earlier, Waite LJ remarked upon the
“modern acceptance of the need to avoid any discrimination on the
ground of sexual orientation.”75 As such, sexual orientation
discrimination seems to be firmly recognized as falling within the
Convention.
2. Justifiable differential treatment?
For Article 14 of the European Convention to be of any use, it is
insufficient that there has been mere differential treatment. The
differential treatment must also be unjustified in order for it to constitute
discrimination. In the context of sexual orientation discrimination there
has not yet emerged any clear standard to which putative justifications
must aspire. However, in the parallel areas of sex discrimination,
72. Even sex discrimination prohibitions are only specious. They are generally restricted to
particular, clearly defined areas such as the field of employment. See the Sex Discrimination Act
1975; Treaty of Rome (also known as Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community),
Mar. 25, 1957, art. 119, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997);
Equal Treatment Directive, Feb. 9, 1976, Dir 76/207 EEC.
73. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1982); Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 186 (1988); Modinos v. Cyprus, Series A, No. 259 (1993); ADT v. United Kingdom, 31
Eur. H.R. Rep. 33 (2001); Smith v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493 (1999).
74. Robert Wintemute, Strasbourg to the Rescue? Same-Sex Partners and Parents Under the
European Convention, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 7, at 713.
See also, e.g., Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1 F.C.R. 653 (2001).
75. Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Hous. Ass’n Ltd., Ch. 304, at 318 (1998).
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discrimination based on illegitimacy, and discrimination based on
nationality, the yardstick seems to be one of “pressing social need.”76
Even without attempting to define this term, it must be conceded that
arguments along these lines can be made in defense of exclusively
heterosexual marriage. Lynn Wardle, for example, appears to view samesex marriage as a threat to the institution of heterosexual marriage.77 In
similar vein, Nan Hunter has argued that single-sex marriage could
“destabilize the gendered definition of marriage.”78 More broadly, the
European Commission of Human Rights has itself remarked that the
intrinsic value to society of families founded on heterosexual marriages
and cohabitation is such that they warrant special protection.79
But it is one thing to concede the pertinence of an argument, and
quite another to concede its strength. Indeed, the force of the first of
these arguments—that same-sex marriage would undermine traditional
marriage—is highly questionable notwithstanding its (probable) ongoing
popularity. As Norrie has pithily observed:
[c]hanging the terms of entry into the state-sanctioned relationship we
call marriage is not in itself an attack on marriage as previously
understood, otherwise parliament has frequently attacked marriage,
such as . . . every time it loosened the forbidden degrees. Did the
Supreme Court of the United States of America attack marriage when it
struck down various states’ rules prohibiting inter-racial marriage in
Loving v Virginia 388 US 1 (1967)? “Traditional” marriage is, in
reality, an ever-changing, ever-evolving beast.80

In short, the strength of the argument derives merely from its ongoing
apparent popularity. But even here we must be cautious, for as Gutmann
has warned (albeit in another context), we must be prepared to accept
that sometimes the dominant ideology may in reality be no more than the
ideology of the dominant.81

76. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 164 (1982) (citing Handyside v.
United Kingdom, 1 E.H.R.R. 737, 753, para. 48). For further analysis, see Fredman, supra note 71,
and Wintemute & Andenæs, supra note 7.
77. Lynn D. Wardle, Same-Sex Marriage and the Limits of Legal Pluralism, in THE
CHANGING FAMILY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE FAMILY AND FAMILY LAW 381 (John
Eekelaar & Thandabantu Nhalpo eds., 1998).
78. Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW AND SEXUALITY
9, 11 (1991).
79. X, Y, & Z v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143 (1997).
80. Norrie, supra note 66, at 156. For further counterargument, see John Murphy, The
Recognition of Same-Sex Families in Britain: The Role of Private International Law, 16 INT’L J.L.
POL’Y & FAM. 181, 186-87 (2002).
81. Amy Gutmann, The Challenge of Multiculturalism in Political Ethics, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
171 (1993).
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The second possible suggested justification for maintaining the
prohibition on same-sex marriage can be distilled down to a no-lesspopular concern about the supposedly doubtful parenting capacities of
same-sex spouses. Here, there is simply insufficient empirical data from
the Netherlands, Belgium and Canada to either refute or confirm the
assumption upon which this concern is founded. Same-sex parenting is
just too new a phenomenon, and too sparsely distributed to provide any
meaningful data. By contrast, however, registered same-sex
partnerships—a close sibling of same-sex marriage—have been around
for some time, and a number of these now permit same-sex couples to
adopt apparently unproblematically.82 There is, therefore, the strong
suspicion that this “inappropriate parents” argument is unfounded.83
Even if these counter arguments do not convince everyone, hopefully
doubters would at least concede the open and unresolved nature of this
debate. That being the case, it is difficult to see how objectors could
satisfy the required standard for their argument: a “pressing social need”
for the retention of a prohibition on same-sex marriage. Unlike other
impediments to marriage—such as a failure to be of the minimum age, or
the (eugenically grounded) prohibited degrees of consanguinity which
are demonstrably imposed for the benefit of children and society—the
prohibition on marriage between persons of the same sex is at best only
arguably of benefit to society. In the absence of an unequivocal threat to
society, it is submitted that the threshold of “pressing social need” cannot
logically be satisfied. If this is correct, then even the doubters must admit
their failure to rebut the strong prima facie argument that the statute is
discriminatory in the accepted manner.
3. Significant countervailing earlier decisions?
Article 14 represents a novel step in English law. For unlike the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, English law does not
provide any general equality guarantee. This means that, outside those
areas specifically covered by statute—such as race, sex and disability
discrimination—there has never before been such a broad guarantee of
equality in this country. Nonetheless, Article 14 remains problematic in
terms of interpretation and in its scope of application. In relation to
claims based on sexual orientation discrimination per se, the English
courts have no domestic authorities to which they may turn. Furthermore,
they are obliged to bear in mind the case law emanating from the

82. See also Polikoff, supra note 11.
83. A further problem with this putative justification is its misconceived assumption that
marriage and parenting are somehow inextricably tied together. This is plainly not the case.
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European Court and Commission of Human Rights,84 which, hitherto,
has not been entirely helpful to the argument advanced here. Indeed, in
terms of the European case law to date, there has been a marked
ambivalence as to the appropriate comparator to use in sexual orientation
discrimination cases.
Stripped down to an uncontroversial proposition, equal treatment
means that like persons should be treated alike. Yet this tells us nothing
of who, for sexual orientation purposes, should constitute the relevant
like persons. In order to deduce these persons we must determine the
appropriate comparator for any given complainant: the person whom the
applicant must taken to be “like.” In the light of past European decisions,
it seems that there are two possible comparators to use in the context of
claims made by persons seeking to enter into a same-sex marriage. Either
a gay man must be compared with a lesbian woman (that is, the
comparison is made with a person in a similarly positioned minority
group) or the gay man must be compared with a heterosexual man.
The notion that a lesbian woman should be the appropriate
comparator for a gay man has its origins in the reasoning of the European
Commission. Equally, in X, Y, and Z v. United Kingdom.85 There, the
Commission heard a complaint brought by a gay couple. Yet it refused to
accept any comparison between a gay couple and a heterosexual couple.
Instead, it said that the gay couple could only compare themselves with a
lesbian couple.86 This may appear ostensibly fair, but in reality it is
deeply flawed. An inter-sex comparison, such as this, is what is required
to expose sex discrimination (not sexual orientation discrimination). In
sex discrimination cases—such as those that typically arise in the
employment sphere—we answer the question “Does employer X
discriminate against women in qualification-based promotions?” by
asking the question “Would men with the same qualifications be
promoted?”. The key difference between the complainant and the
comparator is their respective sexes, and this is why a comparison of the
two allows us to reveal their gender difference to be the basis of the
discrimination. If, by contrast, we are attempting to expose sexual
orientation discrimination against man A, then the appropriate
comparator must be man B who has a different sexual orientation. Any
approach that attempts to use a lesbian woman as the appropriate
comparator for a gay man’s claim of sexual orientation discrimination
will necessarily collapse into self-referential circularity: discrimination

84. Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 2 (Eng.).
85. X, Y, & Z v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143 (1997).
86. Id. at para. 34.
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against gay men cannot be justified by reference to precisely similar
discrimination against lesbian women (and vice versa).
The second possible comparator has its roots in the contrasting later
case of Simpson v. United Kingdom.87 There, the Commission did permit
the lesbian applicant to invoke a heterosexual comparator in order to
found her allegation of sexual orientation discrimination. On the other
hand, the sting in the tail in that case was that the Commission was
prepared to accept the protection of “the family” as an adequate
justification for differential treatment; and at that time, there was a
substantial body of Strasbourg case law excluding same-sex couples
from the definition of “family.”
Unhelpful though this guidance from Europe may appear, all is not
lost. For a start, decisions of the European Court and Commission do not
amount to binding precedents on the English courts. Indeed, the Human
Rights Act 1998 was deliberately framed in such a way that the English
courts should not be bound,88 but instead permitted to be more
progressive (but no more restrictive) than the Strasbourg court in
interpreting the Convention.89 Why, then, would the English courts
choose to adopt an approach at variance with that so far evinced in
Strasbourg? There are at two plausible reasons for so doing.
First, the reasoning in the 1986 Simpson decision could not possibly
be replicated today. It is inconceivable that a current-day European Court
of Human Rights could deny family status to a same-sex married couple
from Belgium or the Netherlands. It is almost equally certain that a
registered same-sex partnership would also be viewed as familial. It
would thus follow that the “special protection for the family” argument
could no longer be invoked to justify legislation prohibiting the
formation of same-sex families. Secondly, the very particularized
discrimination legislation that already does exist in Britain has built into
it the concept of indirect discrimination. This means that, if the courts
wanted to appear consistent, they would hardly be inclined to decide a
gay man’s sexual orientation discrimination claim using the comparator
87. 47 D.R. 274 (1986) (the case concerned the claim by a lesbian woman that she was
entitled to succeed to a tenancy formerly held by her now deceased partner).
88. Under section 2 of the 1998 Act, the English courts are only required to take into account
the decisions and opinions of the European Court of Human Rights and the Commission.
89. While the Human Rights Bill was before Parliament and it was being mooted whether
Strasbourg decisions should bind the English courts, the Lord Chancellor said: “[w]e must remember
that the interpretation of the Convention rights develops over the years . . . . We feel that to accept
this amendment [in favour of making Strasbourg case law binding] removes from the judges the
flexibility and discretion that they require in developing human rights law.” Hansard H.L., 19 Jan.
1998, col. 1271. The clear tenor of this statement is that the English courts may depart from
Strasbourg case law, but only in instances where such a departure would expand the scope of any
given Convention right.
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of a similarly excluded lesbian. Using the logically appropriate
comparator of a heterosexual man would, as Fredman puts it, “ensure
consistency as between the law deriving from the Convention and that is
already in force under domestic and EC Law.”90 It might therefore be
asserted that the English courts would wish to accept a modern notion of
“family” and adjudicate sexual orientation claims on the basis of an intrasex comparator.
Whether the English courts could uphold the sexual orientation
argument articulated here might depend crucially on the question put to it.
If the question took the form “May X marry the person of his choice?,” the
court would be free to afford official vindication to the argument put
forward here. If, by contrast, the question posed were to be “May Mr. X
marry another man?,” then the prohibition in the 1973 statute may validly
be shown to apply to all men equally and thus be no greater impediment to
Mr. X, than to Mr. Y or Mr. Z. Neither question has ever directly arisen in
English litigation, and it is not proposed to speculate on what the courts
would do. The present aim is to demonstrate a strong, legalistic argument
that there may be a set of human rights commitments that, read together,
ground a human rights based claim to same-sex marriage. That said, it
would not be within the spirit of the new human rights in England to
dispose of the problems raised by the first form of the question by simple
judicial prestidigitation whereby the question is reformulated so as to avoid
the difficulties associated with sexual orientation discrimination. As Lord
Browne-Wilkinson, one of the most senior members of the English
judiciary, has explained: “[a]s these moral questions come before the courts
in Convention cases the courts will be required to give moral answers.”91
But even if the question posed is in the second form—”May Mr. X
marry another man?”—all is far from lost, for that, in essence, involves a
question of sex discrimination: “can a man do what we all know a
woman is permitted to do?” It is therefore to that question that we must
now turn.
D. Sexual Orientation as the Basis of Sex Discrimination92
If a court were to be presented with the very specific question, “May
Mr. X marry Mr. Y?” or the equally specific question, “May Miss A
marry Miss B?,” a claim based on direct sex (as opposed to sexual
orientation) discrimination is in issue. It thus follows that in such a case,

90. Fredman, supra note 71, at 116.
91. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, The Impact on Judicial Reasoning, in THE IMPACT OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS BILL ON ENGLISH LAW, supra note 71, at 21.
92. Here I draw heavily on Wintemute, supra note 4.
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none of the objections raised specifically in relation to a claim founded
on sexual orientation discrimination per se will apply. The court would
inescapably, therefore, have to decide whether the current prohibition on
same-sex marriage is discriminatory in its terms.
But how, it may fairly be asked, can a claim ultimately turning on the
claimant’s sexual orientation be characterized as a sex discrimination
case? If one asks the question, “According to English law, who may
marry Mr. X?,” a very likely answer that one will receive is “Any
woman.” If, similarly, one asks, “Who may marry Miss Y?,” it is equally
probable that the reply will be “Any man.”93 What lies behind these
knee-jerk responses,94 of course, is the well-known fact that same-sex
marriage is prohibited. This prohibition therefore raises questions about
sex discrimination since the excluded persons in either case belong to a
single gender. Thus, unlike cases involving sexual orientation
discrimination, the proper comparator is a person of the opposite sex to
the claimant when the question posed relates to the freedom to marry a
named individual. The natural objection to this choice of comparator is
that like persons are not being compared. There is all the difference in
the world, the argument would run, between, say, a gay man wishing to
marry Mr. X, and a heterosexual woman wishing to marry the same Mr.
X. The comparator is both of a different sex to the claimant and of
heterosexual rather than homosexual persuasion. In so being, such a
comparator, it would be argued, bears no resemblance at all to the
claimant, and could hardly be thought to be a “like person.” Nonetheless,
it is demonstrably the case that a heterosexual female is the appropriate
comparator for a homosexual male in cases of sex discrimination turning
on the sexual orientation of the claimant.
As Wintemute has ably demonstrated, the erroneous foundation of
the objection to this choice of comparator is the failure to appreciate that
sexual orientation is ineluctably a sex-based criterion. As he puts it,
“where a person is attracted to a partner of a given sex (eg male),
whether or not that person’s attraction is classified as same-sex or
opposite-sex depends entirely on that person’s own sex.”95 In essence,
then, any discrimination based on sexual orientation is at one and the
same time discrimination based on sex. But when focusing on the sex
discrimination aspects, it is important to ensure that the chosen
comparator is described only in terms that allow the crucial difference
93. In neither case is the suggested response at all accurate. Further qualifications would,
naturally, need to be added referring, for instance, to matters such as the soundness of mind and
existing marital status of the relevant parties.
94. I assume satisfaction of other prerequisites such as competence and unmarried status.
95. Wintemute, supra note 4, at 346.
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between the claimant and the comparator to be exposed. Thus, we must
exclude from our comparison any reference to the sexual orientation of
either party. We need ask, and ask only, “Is it discriminatory to prevent a
man from marrying Mr. X when any woman could marry such a man?”.
It is plainly irrelevant that not all (indeed, very few) men would want to
marry another man. No one, after all, would question the wrongfulness of
sex discrimination turning on a woman’s pregnancy even though not all
women become pregnant or have the desire to do so. Similarly, as was
recognized in the landmark case of Loving v. Virginia,96 it was wrong to
exclude a black person from marrying a white person (even though not
all black people would wish to marry a white person). The point here is
that the same-sex impediment to marriage prevents all men in theory, and
some men in practice, from doing something that “any woman” could do.
It is inescapably discrimination based on sex.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have attempted to show that the passage of the Human Rights Act
1998 has brought with it (through a combination of Articles 12 and 14 of
the Human Rights Convention) the distinct possibility of a novel, nontheoretic, legalistic claim for the acceptance of same-sex marriage. The
argument admittedly depends on a number of contingencies, not least of
which is progressive jurisprudence at a European level. Nor can we
realistically expect a sudden volte face in English law. Indeed, given that
England still awaits the introduction of a facility for registered same-sex
partnerships, it is clear that there is a significant legal mountain to climb
on sexual orientation issues. Nonetheless, what is offered here is a form
of discrimination-based analysis that combines the equality guarantees of
Article 14 with a substantive right that has thus far not seriously been
tested by transsexuals.
In a well-documented series of cases,97 the Strasbourg court has been
able to uphold the domestic courts’ refusals of marriage rights by
reference to the fact that parties did not, as they argued, have the right to
have their birth registration details altered in order that they be legally
recognized by their post-operative sex. In other words, they never
questioned the prohibition of same-sex marriage; they were much more
concerned to be recognized in law as belonging to their post-operative
sex. In this paper, however, I have attempted to tackle head-on the
question which technically only arose as a secondary issue in those cases.
96. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
97. See generally Wintemute, Strasbourg to the Rescue? Same-Sex Partners and Parents
Under the European Convention, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS, supra note
7, at 713-729.
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It therefore enters new legal territory and a willing court need not feel
unduly encumbered by the case law of the past, whether that be domestic
or European case law.
On the other hand, there is an important practical limit to what the
courts can do that must be recorded here. They do not have the
independent power to strike down statutes—even unconscionable and
discriminatory ones. At best, an appellate court has the power under
section 4 of the Human Rights Act to issue a statement of incompatibility
declaring the legislation to be inconsistent with one or more Convention
rights.98 It then falls to the legislature via the fast-track procedure
provided for in section 10 and Schedule 2 of that Act to make the
appropriate amends or repeal.99 One would hope, however—especially in
the light of growing explicit prohibitions of sexual orientation-based
discrimination at the European level100—that the legislature would not be
afraid to do so.

98. Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 4 (Eng.).
99. Id. at § 2.
100. See, e.g., Treaty of Rome (also known as Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community), March 25, 1957, Art. 13, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam,
Oct. 2, 1997); Council Directive 2000/78/EC Nov. 27, 2000.

